

Religio-Political Beliefs about Militancy among General Population of the Punjab, Pakistan; A Cross Sectional Study

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Abstract: *Militancy among the nations is not a new phenomenon. Social, political and religious dynamics of a society often provide the space for militant organizations to operate. Sometimes, the patterns of socialization paved the way for militancy and sometimes political push and pull of a society create the space for militant groups. Militancy and Jihadism became a wide spread behavior of Pakistani people due to Afghan War. The existence and operations of militant organizations is common in Pakistan. The present study is an attempt to explore the militancy trends among general population of Punjab, Pakistan. Survey was conducted to collect primary data on existing and operations of militant organizations. It was analyzed with social, religious and political indicators of people of Punjab. It was revealed that majority of the population in Punjab; do not favor existence and operations of militant organizations. It was also noticed that people involved in participatory democracy dislike militancy. However, people affiliated with some religious organization have little appraisal for jihadist organizations in Punjab.*

Key Words: Militancy, Socialization, Participatory Democracy, Religious Affiliation

1. Introduction

Militancy and proxy war against the established governments is not a new phenomenon. It is common among particularly in the developing world. Militancy is a state in which a group of people try to promote some social, religious or political philosophy by aggressive or violent means in an organized way (Firdaus, 2009). Sedgwick (2004) sees the militancy as result of long standing radical religious movement that is set apart from majority social groups. Sarraj (2001) claimed that militancy is a reinforcement of out groups' continuous oppression. Such groups establish militant organizations by mobilizing religio-political followers to propagate in persistent ways. For example, militancy and radicalization in the West Africa is main cause of political instability of the

region (Olonisakin, 2009). Most of the countries are facing challenge of ramification of militancy by utilizing social and economic resources. Different militant organizations emerged with certain goals against the government and international global ideology mainly developed by the social and political motives (Dijxhoorn, 2014). Most of the violent social movements that have strong linkages with the political and religious shepherd of life often move towards an organized structure of militancy.

Religious and ethnic polarizations in multi ethnic and sectarian states often seek the challenge of rivalry among the different social groups. Some of the groups consider that their opponents have linkage with some militant groups and it is necessary for survival to create a militant wing or to contract with some militant group to counter in socio-political matters they feel in their area. On the other side, it is due to transnational rivalry in the inter religious grounds that there are large number of organizations who have apprehension towards rival nationals and their policies, also establish militant wings to deter or use the force for their rights (Tellis, 2008). Militancy attacks in India often caused by those Islamic groups who have perceptions about Indian government are dangerous about them (Eckert, 2012). The members of such militant organizations are socialized by the approaches of their leaders and underlying circumstances in their surroundings which justify the ways of their discourse.

Pakistan is at front of organized violence and terrorism related incidents, as Pakistan joined coalition against war on terrorism. Most of violent activities are being carried out by the organized groups. These organized groups have close ties with different social and political factions of society. The militant groups in Pakistan sometimes empowered by different political organizations with in country as well as by external powers too. Wide spread militant organizations like, Tehrik e Talban Pakistan, Jaish-e-Muhammad, Sipah e Muhammad and Jindullah are also a result of certain groups' empowerment by internal and external forces. Militarization and extremism in Pakistan are long standing processes,

due to shared domestic and international dynamisms. It is considered a product of people's affiliation through socialization process and psychological signification about organizations' goals and objectives.

Pakistan is multi-sectarian state consisting four major sects along with several minor denominations (Akhtar, 2010). Pakistan comprises 86-90% Sunni population and 06-10 % Shia population as the main cult (Library of Congress, 2005). The both are divided into some sub-sects and there is a little variation among the basic schools of thought of the main two cults. Due to diversity in ethnicity and sectarianism there have been emerged different schools of thought socialize the people of Pakistan in very different ways. The strong affiliation with political and religious organizations has life lasting impacts on individuals' lives (Express Tribune, 2013). The religious and political organizations often lead towards escalation in different ways. Some of them chose radical ways to achieve their goals. From 1970s some political authorities used the sectarian devices to safeguard their governing mechanism. As reinforcement to Bhutto's sectarian policies, Zia ul Haq government focused on a Sunni sect to empower. At the same time within that group Jihadi Militia generated and started to expand its network from base camps to Madrasas (Religious Schools) (Secretariat Youth Parliament Pakistan, 2015). The sectarian exploitation and empowerment of one from each sect remained same in the governments during 1990s. The teaching of heroism of Talban against Soviet Union was a common in some of the madrassas.

In Pakistan, it is dilemma of socio-political life that no one government has succeeded to introduce a unitary national socialization patterns for individuals that could combine the people of Pakistan with a single national interest. During 1980s, during Soviet-Afghan war, it was a demand of system that Pakistan has to accompany by America in supporting the cause of militants who were fighting against Soviet Union. In 1990s, viewing Indian oppression in Kashmir the militant who escaped from Indian occupied Kashmir get refuge of Talban those religious groups who have been a part of Soviet Afghan war (Afridi, 2009). Jihad in Kashmir was started by interconnection of Talban and Mujahidin of Kashmir. Due to national and international media, the both movements won sympathies of some segments of Society. It was the main time of Internationalization of Islamic groups' militancy within and beside Pakistan.

Both political governments after Zia Ul Haq, did not project the upcoming problem in their political tug-of-war. Majority of religious schools were not monitored for their activities. As a result, a big crop that was in favor of Islamic Jihad beyond the

government had produced. There are two main values of the concept of operations of Religious madrassas. One is teaching of Islamic principles and stories of Talban Fight against Soviet Union. Other is to motivate and train militancy projected for future threat from somewhere to Afghanistan and Pakistan.

In early Musharaf era, the government recognized the intensity of the problem of curriculum in Madrassa and its consequences towards militancy (Shabbir, 2012). Government had to face a strong opposition from some segments of the society if it ever tried to alter it. Majority of Pakistanis demanded to support Talban instead of America in War on Terror. Such an opposition might be indicating the socialization patterns brought up by the Madrassa and sectarian influence on general public's mind. The degree of opposition varied comparing the sectarian schools in media.

At present, the most prominent militant terrorist activist group Tehrik-e-Talban Pakistan was established in late 2007. Baitullah Mehsud, a resident of FATA region along with his companions declared the existence of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan by uniting and merging 13 other small groups who were against the American military action against Taliban in Pakistan and Afghanistan (National Counter Terrorism Center, 2014). This alliance has carried out about 891 attacks from 2007 to 2015 that resulted in round about 4907 fatalities and 5718 injuries and disabilities (START, 2014).

The perception about terrorism and counterterrorism vary among the different stake holders in religio-political life of Pakistan. There are some of the political parties which are of the opinion that Talban are on right and they are martyrs (Express Tribune, 2013). There are also some of the religious organizations who extract their Islamization with the principals of Talban Ideology. Government of Pakistan has not yet succeeded to reduce such kind of harmony developed by some political and religious organizations. The frequency of terrorism related activities has been constant for last 6 years.

A detailed literature was reviewed to identify gap for further research and the findings are summarized here:

Method & Materials:

The detailed existing literature reveals that it is a need that there should be baseline data collection about militancy trends about militancy and its appreciation among general population. The study aimed to investigate the social constructed factors responsible for the rise of militancy in Pakistan. The research is descriptive and explanatory. Survey research technique is used for the collection of data. A mixed method of close ended and open-ended

questions were used in the research tool. Primary data was obtained through a self-administrated structured questionnaire. The male, aged 15 to 50 years, of the province Punjab were target population. The researcher used Time Allocated Sampling Technique to identify the respondent for data collection regarding their perception about militancy and militant organizations. The researcher collected data from most frequently terrorism victimized cities, i.e. Lahore and Rawalpindi of province Punjab, Pakistan. These two cities are victimized by large number of terrorist attacks so far. The researcher approached 372 respondents for data collection. Recruiting process of respondents was based on predefined conditions i.e. every third respondent belong to province Punjab, at interview locality. In case of non-feasibility or non-willingness of respondent defined respondent, the research moved for the immediately next one for data collection.

Findings:






Figure 1 describes the age structure of the respondents. Majority of population for the study was young, out of which 38.7 % people fall in 15-24 age group, 25.5 % were from 25-34 years, 23.1 percent from 35-44 years, and only 5.6% were above 55 years. Majority of the respondents were young with a median age 26.9 year.



It was also revealed that a clear majority i.e. 97.8% were Muslim and only 2.2% were Christians.



Above figure depicts the picture of sectarian arraignment. It was found that from the sample 60.2% belong to Brailvi Sect, 24.7% Deoband Sect, Shia were 7.0% and 5.9% were the Ahl-e-Hadish sect. The Brailvi Sect seems to be a wide majority in all over the Pakistan.

Figure 4 shows the ethnic divisions of the sampled respondents. It was learnt that 51.1 % Punjabi, 1.3% were Pashtun, 1.6% Baloch, Saraiki were 10.2%, Pothohari were 17.7%, Muhajir were 5.3%, Hazara consisted of 8.3% and 4.3% Kashmiri settlements were present in Punjab.

Table 3.1

Variables	Attributes	Frequency	%
Respondents' Affiliation with Political Organizations	PML (N)	63	16.9
	PPP	19	5.1
	Jamat e Islami	24	6.5
	PML (Q)	6	1.6
	PAT	3	.8
	PTI	131	35.2
	None	126	33.9
Respondents' Affiliation with Religious Organizations	Jamat e Islami	17	4.6
	JUI	12	3.2
	Dawat e Islami	20	5.4
	Minhaj ul Quran	19	5.1
	Sipah e Sihaba	3	.8
	Tableegi Jamat	42	11.3
	Jamat U Dawat	25	6.7
	None	234	62.9

Table 3.1 shows the frequency and percentage of respondents' religio-political affiliation. It was discussed by the respondents that 5.1% liked PPP, 1.6% supported PML (Q), 6.5% supported Jamat-e-Islami, 16.9% opted PML (N), 0.8% of respondents were supporters of PAT, and 35.2% declared themselves as members of Pakistan Tehrik-e-Insaf, whereas 33.9% claimed that they did not belong to any political party.

Respondent's religious affiliation towards different religious organizations and parties was

discussed. It was found that 4.6% of Jamat-e-Islami, 3.2% were followers of Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam, 5.4% belonged to Dawat-e-Islami, 5.1% followed Therik-e-Minhaj-ul-Quraan, 0.8% were members of Sipah-e-Sahaba, 11.3% followed Tableegi Jamat, 6.7% supported Jamat-u-Dawat as religious organization and 62.9% remained apart from any religious organization.

It is considered that militant behavior mostly responsible for violence and terrorism related activities. Pakistan has witnessed a series of sectarian violence between Shia and Deoband (Sunni). Long standing rivalries between Sunni and Shia sects in Afghanistan and Pakistan have implicit and explicit implications in current pace of terrorism in Pakistan (ICG, 2005). Furthermore, as Khan (2005) has stated that some of the sects in various religions found in confrontation and armed struggle.

Association with political parties often differ by the passage of time. People change political association within very short span of time due to socio-economic and political issues. But in case of religious association, the people of Pakistan most often remain constant. It is considered that in Pakistan religious affiliation most often remains constant. It is assumed that at some individuals in religious groups have linkages with extremist organizations who covertly support for militant groups for their cause. A regional scholar Niazi (2014) also illustrated that few of the religious organizations hold strongly their followers and they often seem to pressurize government to in their causes. Hussain (2005) also supported underlying supposition while stating that most people living in Pakistan having affiliations with the religious organizations and they act according to leaders choice.

Militancy and War in Public Opinion

Q #	Questions/Statements	Attributes	Frequency	%
1	Militant organizations should operate in Pakistan	Yes	88	23.7
		No	284	76.3
2	Jihad should be promoted militant groups in Muslim world	Yes	99	26.6
		No	273	73.4
3	Pakistan should fight against American due to her attack on Afghanistan	Yes	56	15.1
		No	316	84.9
4	Militant organizations should fight against America in Afghanistan	Yes	73	19.6
		No	299	80.4
5	Pakistan should fight	Yes	180	48.4

	against India due to her accession over Kashmir	No	192	51.6
6	Jihadist groups have right to fight against Indian siege in Kashmir	Yes	104	28.0
		No	268	72.0

Above table describes respondents' views about existence and functioning of militant organizations in Pakistan. Table describes frequencies and percentage about functioning of militant organizations in name of Jihad in Pakistan and other Muslim occupied areas. It was also asked that whether Pakistan government should make active measures in those cases. The results showed that 23.7% of the respondents accepted that the militant/Jihadist organizations has right to operate in Pakistan but 76.3% denied such operations. Furthermore, data reveals that 26.6% of respondents said that Jihadist organizations should operate for Jihad in all over the Muslim world, meanwhile 73.4% of respondents contradicted to this claim.

Regarding American military control over Afghanistan the respondents were asked whether Pakistan and militant organizations should fight against American. The results say that 15.1% of the sample urged that Pakistan ought to struggle against American forces for Afghanistan. Whereas majority of respondents i.e. 84.9%, did not favor in involvement of Pakistan in US-Afghan issue. It was also assessed that majority of respondents (80.4%) have same ideas regarding role of Jihadist organizations in case Afghanistan and a marginal group of people 19.6% were in favor of Jihad against America in Afghanistan.

The table 3.2 portrays the public views about Indian illegal control over Kashmir and role of Pakistan government in the light of public opinion. It was considered that around half of respondents i.e. 48.4% intended that Pakistan government ought to fight against India in solution of Kashmir issue because India is not willing to negotiate since last 65 years. At the same time above half of the sample 51.6% recorded unfavorable remarks that Pakistan should not fight to India for this cause.

The above table contains information of public opinion about role of Jihadist organizations in Indian occupied Kashmir. Comparatively greater number in sample i.e. 28.0% thought that militant organizations were to fight against Indian illegal control over Kashmir, although 72.0% were against such role of Jihadist organizations. It is a wide considered assumption in some religious segments that America and India both are occupying Muslim territories. They have opinion that Pakistan Government should help the Muslims at both places. Majority of the people in Pakistan in favor of state oriented policies regarding the national and international affairs. Scholarly it is of the opinion that in Pakistan, it is a

desire of fewer that it is right of indigenous people, who are engaged in Jihad against America, it is their right (Zahid, 2015). It is also assumed in literature that America and India permitting indirectly some sects and parties within Pakistan to influence general public in their attitude regarding militancy (Ahmed, 2010). Due to long standing mistrust and recent contention issues, Pakistani people have antagonism for these states (Masood, 2012 & Rubin, 2002). As a reinforcement, few of the respondents favored struggle of indigenous people against such states.

Political Affiliation and Military Trends

Table 3.2

The table 3.2 explains the participation of respondents in general election 2013 held in Pakistan and their support for political parties.

Q #	Questions/ Statements	Attributes	Frequ-ency	%
07	Participate in Election 2013	Yes	257	69.1
		No	115	30.9
08	Voted for which party	Jamat e Islami	21	5.6
		PPP	18	4.8
		Independent	6	1.6
		PTI	113	30.4
		PML (N)	99	26.6
		N/A	115	30.9

Above table describes voting behavior of people in election 2013. The results illustrate that 69.1% were participated in election 2013 and 30.9% did not voted in election 2013. Furthermore, respondents voting behavior was also evaluated and it was learnt that 26.6% of the respondents supported PML (N), 4.8% voted for PPP, 30.4 % of respondents claimed that they voted for PTI, 5.6% given vote to Jamat e Islami, 1.6% respondents gave votes to independent candidates in election, whereas 30.9% from the sample did not participated in general election 2013.

Legal and constitutional changes in Pakistan by the passage of time paved the way of discrimination of some sects and empowered some. Such an arrangement was the significant factor behind the establishment of different religious organizations who work as safeguard of their sects. In case of political processes by the parties in power, like sectarian arrangements, some political parties empower different groups for clash with their opponent. Some of the political entities and they also establish advocating units for their rights that they seek violated by some other parties. In Pakistan, it has been witnessed since last two decades there were series of target killings and violence has been seen in

city Karachi and Baluchistan which has been mainly regarded as political or ethnic violence. In this regard, the trends of militancy were also tested among the voters of different political parties regarding the promotion of Jihadist Ideology.

Hypothesis 1

H0: There is no association between political affiliation of respondents and their support for militant organization.

H1: There is significant association between political affiliation of respondents and their support for militant organization.

Political Affiliation * Militant organizations should operate in Pakistan		Militant organizations should operate in Pakistan		
		Yes	No	Total
Political Affiliation	Yes	Count 50	196	246
	%	20.3%	79.7%	100.0%
Political Affiliation	No	Count 38	88	126
	%	30.2%	69.8%	100.0%
Total		Count 88	284	372
		%	23.7%	76.3%
			100.0%	

Pearson Chi-Square Value	4.461 ^a
P value	.035
Cramer's V	.110
Odds Ratio	.591
RR for Political Affiliation: (Yes)	.674
RR for Political Affiliation: (No)	1.141

Affiliation with Religious Org * Jihad organizations should operate in Muslim world		Jihad organizations should operate in Muslim world		
		Yes	No	Total
Affiliation with Religious Organization	Yes	Count 51	87	138
	%	37.0%	63.0%	100.0%
Affiliation with Religious Organization	No	Count 48	186	234
	%	20.5%	79.5%	100.0%
Total		Count 99	273	372
		%	26.6%	73.4%
			100.0%	

Pearson Chi-Square Value	12.018 ^a
P value	.001
Cramer's V	.180

Odds Ratio	2.272
RR for Political Affiliation: (Yes)	1.802
RR for Political Affiliation: (No)	.793

It was learnt that p -value of the test (0.35) is less than value of α (0.05), so the null hypothesis H_0 is rejected based on given data. It seems that there is significant association between two variables. It tells us how likely political affiliated discriminate that militant organizations should operate in Pakistan in compare to those who have not political affiliation. Cramer's V test value (.110) tells that there is very strong association between political affiliated persons and their disliking opinion regarding operations of militant organizations. Odds (0.555) of political affiliated persons in support for operations of militant organizations in Pakistan is very less as compare to odds (1.801) of those who are not politically affiliated to any of organization and have acceptance for operations of militant organizations. Relative risk (0.664) of support for militant organizations by the political affiliated persons is lowers as compared with the relative risk (1.160) of support for militant organizations by those who do not have political affiliation is very greater. It seems that the people who are not belong to any political party are on greater risk to support and involve in the operations of militant organization. The respondents who believe in participatory democracy for gaining power have less tendency of militancy as compare to those who are not democrats and don't participate in electoral process. In the meanwhile, politically affiliated persons are less likely to support militant organizations and their operations.

Hypothesis 2

H₀: There is no association between affiliation with religious organization and operations of militant organizations in Muslim world.

H₁: There is significant association between affiliation with religious organization and operations of militant organizations in Muslim world.

Because p value (.001) of our test is less than α value (0.05) so we reject the study null hypothesis H_0 on the basis of given sample data and conclude that there is association between affiliation with religious organization and support Jihad in Muslim world. Positive relationship occurs that higher the affiliation with religious organization results in higher the support for militant organizations for their Jihad in Muslim world. The strength of relationship is very significant as Cramer's V test value (0.180) describes the strength with positive number.

How likely people affiliated with religious organizations supposed to support that militant organizations should operate in Muslim world for the cause of jihad as compare to those who do not have affiliation with any of religious organizations. Odds of people attached with religious organizations (2.272) affirms that Jihad should be promoted by militant organizations in Muslim world.

Odds (2.272) of persons connected with religious organizations are to odds (0.440) of not affiliated with religious organization in higher in support for operations of militant organization in Muslim world for Jihad.

Risk of support for militant organizations by the religious affiliated people is more (RR 1.802) whereas the people who are not connected with religious organization are on lower risk (RR 0.793) to indulge in support for such militant groups.

The people who are attached with religious organizations give conformity about operations of Jihadist organizations in Muslim world as compare to those who have not connections with any religious organization. Binding into the evidences of existing literature, which also confirms that who are not attached with any religious organization condemn operations of militant and Jihadist organizations in the province Punjab of Pakistan (Afridi, 2009). It seems that as the religious organizations influence on minds of people, they socialized them about promotion of Jihadist ideology.

Conclusion

The present study arranged the multi-ethnic and multi-sectarian population for the study from the province Punjab consisting upon all major ethnicities and representation form all major religious sects. The population represents political and religious affiliations towards different political and religious organizations also but majority of the respondents likes the electoral process for the pursuit of power. On the other hand, majority of the respondents does not like to be a part of religious organizations to follow. It was considered that the religious parties have much influence over human beings in Pakistan and the majority of the people follow the ideology of leadership of religious organization. But the present study reveals that mainstream population i.e. 62.9% is apart from such kind of communion that is regarded for religious organizations. It was assumed that the religious organizations mostly stress on the militant ways against their sectarian opponents and religious opponents, and in Pakistan such kind of organizations have strong support from the messes. Whereas, the present study has evidences that in Province Punjab, the religious organizations who seek for militancy, are not having massive support for their operations and existence in Pakistan.

On the other side, most of the people belong to the Punjab like democracy and electoral process for source of power and for action plan in the certain circumstances. But the political influence over human mind might vary in the passage of time as compared with the religious doctrine play its role (Niazi, 2014). It was assumed that government of Pakistan is being forced to cooperate with some terrorist and Jihadist organizations because they have massive support from the public. The study indicates that most of the people from Punjab are not in the favor of such Jihadist and militant organizations because they are not favoring a single organization in a huge fraction.

The emergence of some religious and political militant wings in Pakistan traced back from 1970s politics, when Z.A. Bhutto regime empowered some Shia population. Contrary Zia ul Haq also empowered some of the Sunni sects with armed (Secretariat Youth Parliament Pakistan, 2015). The both government have some political ends to be achieved by these wings not for Jihad in the world. The people at that time also come forward and joined such militant wings because governments of that time were backing. The scenario has changed at present. No one government after 1999 favoring any kind of militant wing or organization so the public perception and inspiration for militant organizations has been changed over time.

In case of existence and operations of Jihadist organizations in Pakistan 76.3% of the respondents were not in the favor of Jihadist organization. The support of Jihad is conditional to the external powers who subjugate the Muslim population surrounding by Pakistan. Literature has lot of suggestions about the formation of militancy wings in religious and political organizations in Pakistan. It was also described that some of the religious and political organizations have militant wings. The militant wings of organizations pursue a violent goal which one organization cannot achieve politically or peaceful social movement. It depends on the public and instrumental strength that a militant organization gains. In case of existence and promotion of Jihad and militancy in Pakistan, the study hypothesis no. 2 evokes that political affiliation of the people decrease the militancy trends in public.

It was often blamed by India that Jamat-ul-Dawat is a stake holder in Pakistan and a wide majority along with government supports it for its operations in Kashmir and India. But the present study reveals that overall 6.7% from the respondents people belong to Jamat-ul-Dawat. It is a very little fraction of population of Punjab.

The study also emphasis on the mode of action of Jihadist organizations in the case of American invasion in Afghanistan and Indian insurgencies in disputed Jammu and Kashmir. In case of Afghanistan most of the respondents don't think that Pakistan

should fight with America because Afghanistan is not integral part of Pakistan. In the case of India, a half of people i.e. 48.4% said that Pakistan should fight against Indian illegal accession of Kashmir. But in the case of operations of Jihadist organizations the 28.0% of the sample of the view that Jihadist Organizations has right to fight against Indian illegal accession over Kashmir. Kashmir is considered a constitutional integral part of Pakistan. So, the people of Pakistan have radical intensions about insurgencies creating by India in Kashmir (Masood, 2012). Bolstering to the all kind of attachment to Kashmir, people of Pakistan like the Jihadist Organizations for their operation against India.

It was also assumed that what is the place of Jihadist organizations in Punjab. The present study hypothesis no. 2 has concluded that the strong affiliation with religious organizations are at risk in favoring militant groups as compared with those who don't like any religious organization. Thus, it is somehow element of socializations the people about militancy in some religious organizations. The existing literature also stresses on this assumption. In the present study, it reveals that the people who have no belongings with religious organizations are far away from jihadist organizations in the province Punjab of Pakistan. It can be said that the religious organizations may have some patterns of socializations which promotes affiliations with militant and Jihadist organizations in Punjab.

Legal and constitutional changes in Pakistan by the passage of time paved the way of discrimination of some sects and empowered some. Such an arrangement was the significant factor behind the establishment of different religious organizations who work as safeguard of their sects. The same problem lied with the political entities and they also establish advocating units for their rights that they seek violated by some other parties. In this regard, trends of militancy were also tested among the voters of different political parties regarding the promotion of Jihadist Ideology. The present study found that from male population of province of Punjab 69.1% of respondents participated in election 2013. The study hypothesis no. 1 suggests that people believe in participation democracy for power distribution are less likely in support for operations of Jihadist organizations. Given data concludes that the people who do not affiliated with any of political party are in greater risk for support the operations of Jihadist organizations. It seems that the respondents who believe in democracy have less tendency of militancy as compare to those who are not democrats and don't participate in electoral process.

The present study mainly stresses upon two types of organizations and their association with existence and operations of Jihadist/militant organizations. In case of political organizations, it is considered based on data of study, that majority of people likes

democracy and have very less support for any kind of Jihadist organization. In case of religious organizations, most of the people who are not part of religious organizations have very less support for militancy. Very less people follow the religious leaders and those have some tendencies of support operations of Jihadist organizations.

As the political and democratic awareness promotes in a society, the social destructive movements decrease gradually by the passage of time. The Pakistani society is going to be democratic and electoral behavior is going to be increase in the present circumstances. It was considered that religious organizations' threshold in 1970s was in its peak in Pakistan. But presently, religious organizations' influence in going to be decrease over human mind and they are not being a part of such kind of bilateral clash agenda. So, the militancy trends also going to be decreased among the people of Pakistan.

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