

Empirical Study on Civil Military Relations: The Indian Perspective and the Way Ahead

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Abstract : *The Indian Armed Forces render invaluable service, in times of war and peace, thus ensuring the security of the nation. Indian Bureaucratic model has emerged from the British Raj. Post-Independence, the constitution improved the model left behind the Britishers. The Armed Forces and Bureaucracy are strong pillars of the nation and require to work in conjunction. Despite nations vibrant growth in all sectors, it is widely perceived that the Indian Armed Forces have not been recognized and the Bureaucracy has gone well beyond its mandate as given in constitution, thereby widening the gap in Civil Military Relations.*

Keywords: *Civil-military relation; Role, Government, Control, Absent dialogue*

1. Introduction

The Civil Military Relations refer broadly to the interactions between the Armed Forces as an institution and the sectors of the society they are embedded in. Most commonly the Civil Military Relations (CMR) focus on the relative distribution of power between the Government and the Armed Forces of the country. CMR is a very diverse expression which links the civil society at large and the military -an organization created for protection of civil society. The matter has been a subject of study and linked controversy since the times of Sun Tzu and Clausewitz, both of whom argued that the military was primarily a servant of the State, basing it on an assumption that civil control of a State is preferable to Military control. Post the end of World War II, the theories on this were propagated by great thinkers Samuel Huntington and Morris Janowitz. Post end of Cold war period, there have been elaborate discussions on CMR by the two super powers USA and Russia, taking into considerations various military coups worldwide in 1960 & 1970's resulting in overthrow of democracy.

CMR form an essential strand of national security policy. In peace, they affect the internal stability of a nation state; in war, they influence the outcome. The aim of national security policy is to enhance the safety of nation's social, economic and political

institutions against the threats arising from other independent nation states (Samuel P. Huntington,2005). This being said, the perspective of most developing nations is that military's missions is not a purely external one. Often constitutions, mandate that Armed Forces play an important internal security role. Also, apart from their primary role, militaries, have to play an important role in disaster management and also maintenance of essential services in times of emergencies. The Constitution of India mandates Armed Forces to aid the Civil authority as directed by the Government from time to time. In the present everchanging global environment, the concept of national power has changed. It now includes Social, Military, Cultural, Human, Energy, Food, Cyber and technology factors. Depleting resources, global warming, food and water shortages, regional conflicts, demographical changes and its impact on the country has also modified the role of the Armed Forces and forced it to look beyond the borders. The Armed Forces not only protect the sovereignty but also caters for its role in economic and human security. Humanitarian, Peacekeeping and rehabilitation efforts are always on, thereby changing the role of Armed Forces. Under these circumstances, clash of role and responsibility of Armed Forces and Civil administration takes place. The traditional division of labor between the two, is hence, not clear and remains blurred. (Peter D Feaver,1999).

2. Literature Review

The Armed Forces are organizational entities shaped for a range of purposes and also reshaped in relation to not only functional demands but also Social -Political factors. (Kerbs,2004). The Army profession under British Indian Army was a constellation of martial caste status, land ownership, dominant caste syndrome and good bodily physique. (Chowdary P,2012). The 'loyalists' concept equating it with 'Izzat' -honor and prestige emerged. The Indian Armed Forces per se have played a preeminent role in society not merely as Republic's defender but also guardian of secularism (Narli N,2005).

With the changing International Relations, emergence of new Geo –Political-Economic threats confronting the nation, Armed forces have to align themselves with the inevitable change. (Baylis, J., Smith, S.,1997). There is an ongoing redefinition of their roles, organizations and financing (Forster A,2005). In the post-cold war era, with the ever-changing dimensions of International Relations, Militaries across the world are engaged in ongoing adoption, which is further challenging their relations with civil society in which they serve (Burk, 1998). There is a shift in the overview of democracies and its fundamentals are also changing & adapting to globalization and transnationalism. This invariably is leading to a changed balance between the civil society & the Armed Forces (Cotter, Edmunds and Forster, 2002a).

The Indian Armed Forces have played a key role in democratization process of nation since independence. The same has been acknowledged by all. However, formation of new democratic institutional structures, behavioral changes, downsizing of Armed Forces, emergence of civil leadership in defence and security matters so as to establish civil supremacy has been promoted by Political & Bureaucratic class. (Heiduk F,2011). This is in background of the very fact that political leadership developing into an extremely demanding business with the support of sophisticated bureaucracy. (Forster S,2011). In Indian context, various Military reforms in the overall gambit of changes in Civil-Military relations have been thwarted by bureaucracy. (McDermott

R N et al.,2012). Thus, role of Armed Forces has now become much more complex and challenging. (Janowitz, 1960).

Our Armed Forces operate in a `Mature` democracy (Yehuda Ben Meir, 1995). Ours is a case of Civilian control over Military, where it is perceived that `Civilians have `The right to be Wrong`. However, a need has been felt to establish a `Normative Theory` in Civil –Military relations so as to protect democratic values. (James Burk, 2002). Harmony is achieved by close & sympathetic social relations within the group. (Mokgoro, 1998). Huntington`s `objective control` best describes Civil –Military relations in India (Amit Mukherjee,2013). Both Civil &Military establishments should live as a community, sharing overall way of life, inspired by the notion of common good. (Gyekye, 2004). The overall operational effectiveness of Armed Forces should not be compromised and gap not widened. (Strachan, H,2003).

The challenge thrown by various threats are met by Military leadership with foresight in developing new military doctrine.(Forster, Edmunds and Cotter,2002).What the political class fails to see is the revolution taking place in real time intelligence, guided weapons and network centric operations which have a direct bearing on the way the Armed Forces are operated and managed.(Freedman,1998;Goldman,2003;Gormley ,2003; Harknett,2003).Armed Forces work on the principle of Mission Accomplishment even if it involves supreme sacrifice for the nation. As per the tenants of Exchange Theory (Eisenberger et al.:500-507), the Armed Forces expect complete support of the state. The support can be in terms of Emotional (Respect, Trust, appreciation for work) or instrumental (Policies, coordination). (Indira Awasthy, USI,1986:56).State policies of bolstering central control over Armed Forces may result in lack of transparency and infighting between force structures. (Pallin CV, 2008). Treatment of Armed Forces as a mere obedient bureaucracy in hands of civil masters should not be advocated. The stakeholders should value their expert knowledge and expertise in various arenas of National security. (Snider, H,2003). Even in Military & economic strong nations like USA & U.K. the gap is visible. (Strachan, H,2003).

The current structure of Civil-Military relations in Indian context has been described as an `Absent Dialogue` which has an adverse impact on the military effectiveness. (Mukherjee, A,2013). The gap can be eased by opening a `Public Debate` and restructuring of `Reserve Forces` in order to enhance their regional identity. (Strachan, H,2003). Establishment of `Trust in Government` and `Political Trust` can also bridge this gap. (Schneider, I,2016). One must not forget the least that a viable & effective state structure, in terms of bureaucracy and military is a necessity for sustained Independence. (Lal, M, 2010). Civil – Military interface should be integrated within the Interagency arena as well as within the Ministry of Defence. This will create a cooperative culture of mutual trust & understanding among Officers of various departments, agencies and units. (Egnell, R, 2009).Political scientists have proposed a multitude of contending theories on civil-military relations in new democracies, postulating an array of explanatory variables ranging from ideational factors like military internal norms and values (e.g., Stepan, 1988; Fitch, 1998; Loveman, 1999) or the dominant political culture in society (e.g., Mares, 1998), institutional factors like the legacies of the prior regime or the institutional setup of the state (e.g., Aguero, 1995a; Pion-Berlin, 1997), to large-scale structural conditions like socio-economic performance and the security situation of the new

civilian democratic regime (e.g., Desch, 1999; Alagappa, 2001). Each of these approaches not only subscribes to a specific substantial claim concerning the most important factors explaining civil-military relations in new democracies, but also takes up a certain position towards the structure-agency problem which has been identified as a core issue in social science theory. Simplified, the problem centers around the question how to theoretically capture the fact that social phenomena are produced by human (inter-)action ('agency'), while at the same time appreciating that these actions themselves are influenced by factors exogenous to the actors ('structure') (Dessler, 1989; Wight, 2006).

3. Research Gaps

Based on extensive literature review, research gaps which emerge are as follows:

- (a) Studies identifying the internal factors leading to widening gaps in CMR in Indian context are unavailable.
- (b) Information in open domain on the dimensions giving an edge to Civil Services over Indian Armed Forces is not accessible.

4. Methodology of conduct

4.1 Statement of Problem.

The normal function of the bureaucracy is to execute the policies of the Council of Ministers. Under the system of delegated legislation, the powers of bureaucracy are steadily increasing. As India, has accepted the principle of welfare state, the economic and social functions of the State are steadily increasing. Every increase in the power of the government means a corresponding increase in the powers of the bureaucracy. It is on the successful and satisfactory functioning of the bureaucracy that the success of the government to a very large extent depends. On other hand, in today's context and also for the future, the role for Indian Armed forces cannot be confined to the guarding the borders, but needs to be seen as one which also looks within and beyond borders of land, sky and sea. The new role of the Armed Forces thus calls for revisiting the foreign policies in order to emerge as Global power in ever changing socio-economic- political -geostrategic system. The role of the Armed Forces should be seen in light of the steady economic progress that the country for which they have been a major contributor. Also, the Forces have shown their flexibility by aligning themselves with National interest and keeping the flag flying high by

securing the nation's three frontiers, assisting Central and State Government in fighting the evils of 'proxy war', and provide aid to civil authority when requisitioned for the purpose. Subsequently, the United Nations acknowledged the contribution of Indian Armed Forces in building a strong democracy in Indian context, and assigned them with the role of "peace-keeping and peace-building anywhere on the globe and thereby contribute to world peace and harmony." No other armed forces in the world have faced such challenges in their own countries and abroad, and it is to the credit of our military leaders that we have come this far with the world looking at us with amazement. The Military leadership has always railed at this imbalance in decision making structure at the highest levels but has been unable to change the system so far. The constant state of tension between 'Generalist' Bureaucracy and 'Specialists' Military leaders has resulted in Armed Forces to be on 'receiving' side always. The political executive, starting with India's first Prime Minister, has generally excluded the military leadership from decision making process at the highest levels. Indian Armed Forces have always been and will always be a contributor in Nation's growth. It is for the civil leadership and bureaucrats to be alive to the needs and requirements of large well trained, motivated and selfless HR force of Armed Forces. However, history is a witness that in India the Political executive, barring a handful few, neither have the knowledge nor any interest in matters related to Military and therefore depend completely on inputs from the bureaucrats who would continue to mold the political perceptions on governance and administration. The apathy is that Chiefs and HQ staff being available at disposal of politicians are never consulted for important issues affecting the morale of the forces and decisions taken unilaterally leading to representations and further widening the already existing gap between Civil-Military Parlors.

4.2 Conceptual Framework

Civilian control of the military is a condition sine qua non for democratic consolidation. Without sound, civilian control, democratic transition and consolidation remain fragile and subject to potential reversal by nondemocratic forces. Civilian control of the military is one of the core components of democracy that needs to be institutionalized if a newly democratized polity is to be considered consolidated (Schmitter, 1995; Diamond and Plattner, 1996; Linz and Stepan, 1996; Merkel 2004). In spite of this consensus, the voluminous literature on transitions to democracy still lacks a universally accepted definition and

conceptualization of civilian control. Building on recent theoretical work by Kenneth Kemp and Charles Hudlin (1992), Felipe Agüero (1995), and Peter Feaver (2003), we propose to define civilian control as a particular state in the relations between the civilian political authorities and the military leadership in which the civilians along with Military work together to decide on national policies. Civilians in conjunction with military define the boundaries between policymaking and policy implementation. In this sense, civilian control is a relative condition that is, it is possible to distinguish different degrees of civilian control (e.g., strong or weak, encompassing or limited). To be able to differentiate degrees of civilian control, we distinguish three decision-making areas: elite recruitment and overall public, policy, national defense, and internal security (Colton 1979; Alagappa' 2001; Trinkunas 2005). Even in established democracies, officers are involved in the formulation of defense policies, provide expertise to civilian decision makers, and exercise authority over the military's internal organizational structure. Since a certain degree of "institutional autonomy" (Pion-Berlin, 1992) is functional for the military to fulfill its mission, militaries usually enjoy some autonomous decision-making powers concerning internal affairs. Both established and new democracies deploy their armed forces to provide disaster relief, to support the civilian police force and border control troops, or to fight insurgencies and terrorism. These activities, however, are compatible with civilian control only if civilians decide the range, duration, and frequency of these missions and if civilian institutions are able to monitor the military's internal security operations. Disaggregating civilian control into these three areas allows for nuance in analysis, permits differentiated assessments of the overall patterns of civilian control, and avoids untenable dichotomies. Furthermore, it also provides a framework for the systematic cross-national comparison of the specific forms, patterns, and dynamics of civil-military relations in new democracies. The Process Model and the rationale of 3 D (Defence, Diplomacy and Development) concept in relation to the field of research was studied.


4.2.1 The Process Model

This model relates the cooperative CMR arrangement in terms of meeting of two people, their falling in love when engaged and growing old together or sometimes taking a harsh step of divorce (Kanter,1994). In similar lines in Indian context, for the CMR, we saw the Formation Phase (1947 to 1960), the Operation Phase (1960 to 1990) and the Evolution Phase (1990 and beyond) which

had many overlapping phase lines getting evolved over the years. The three phases have been divided into broadly six steps. In the Formation Phase, we have three steps. First the two actors when they meet have to decide that whether or not they have to cooperate (Yoshino and Rangan,1995). Based on its mission, mandate, and domain, each actor will execute an internal and external analysis to make up his mind (Huijzer et al.,1990).Internal analysis aims at a clear understanding of one's own organization, including insight into one's own strengths and weaknesses for competitive advantage and organizational vulnerabilities to be corrected (Pearce and Robinson 2003).External analysis strives for a profound understanding of the external environment ,encompassing insight into the dynamics of complex emergency, and also the needs and actor analysis. The other important step in this is to design a cooperative arrangement between the actors (Lewis 1990). They should work out the design of cooperation, which has binding on the partners. (Child and Faulkner 1998). This agreement known as Memorandum of Understanding (Das and Teng ,1997; Demurenko and Nikitin ,1997) should include (a) Precise definition of rights and duties (b) Agreement on clear and realistic objectives and (c) Final plan and fixed milestones. Klein Woolthuis (1999) emphasizes that these commitments reflect more trusting relationships, whereas the contracts emphasizing safeguarding arrangements reflect relationships that are less trusting. Having completed the Formation Phase, the second phase and four steps involves cooperative arrangement to achieve the objectives. Kelly et al. (2002), emphasis that the ``actual takeoffs' 'are likely to challenging for most actors since there are going to be cultural differences, communication barriers, lingering suspicions about the partner motives, and latent opposition in partner's organization.

The third phase of the model contains the evolution of cooperation. According to the research on cooperative arrangements, the evolution phase distinguishes termination and modification of arrangement (Mulyowahyudi ,2001). For preventing long term involvement of Military in crisis, this arrangement has to be terminated after completing the operation phase and tasks and responsibilities have to be transferred. If, however, both want to continue their relationship, a new agreement should be developed.

The final step of model involves evaluation of cooperation, to facilitate effective communication between organizations, to learn important lessons, and to account for the activities that have been undertaken. (ALNAP, 2006; Pijnappel ,2004). Figure below shows this model.



PROCESS MODEL FOR CIVIL-MILITARY CO OPERATIVE ARRANGEMENT

4.2.2 The 3 D Concept

The `3D` Concept refers to Defence, Diplomacy and Development, which is an old concept but relevant in CMR in today's era of growing technology and ``new wars``. With the worldwide security context change, the concept of international approach to peace operations and integration of civil expertise in military operations also changed. New goals had to be set and models of `measuring results` had to be established, so as to have an effective cooperation between Civil and Military partners. However, with new developments in the battlefield both within the borders and outside the territory, new foreign policies have to be formalized with better CMR. Hence, the 3 D approach in today's context, is an `Comprehensive Approach`.

5. Hypothesis

The Civil -Military relations in India developed over two centuries of British Colonialism and, in course of time, tuned into tradition of Parliamentary & Civil control over the Military apparatus, so important for the India's democratic dispensation. Our first Prime Minister, Pandit Nehru, was deeply animated by British Civil-Military legacy. To be sure, CMR in India constitute ``a multi factor model``: one, the armed

forces, their size, sociology, level of professionalism and cohesion; two, socio-political and economic environment in which the forces function; and, most of all a political culture to shape and facilitate the process of democratization taking strong roots. As such, the four hypotheses for the research are as follows:

- (a) The ideology of present Civil -Military relations in India is a gift of colonial British Raj and shaped up due disjunction between the Political leadership and Military leadership at time of independence.
- (b) There is a widening of gap and trust deficit between Civil & Military parlors in India since Independence.
- (c) There has been an overall decline in the societal status, financial benefits of the Armed forces when compared to bureaucratic counterparts since Independence.
- (d) The Indian Armed forces have always delivered beyond the expectations and strengthened the nations democracy and GDP since Independence.

6. Justification of Research

The CMR are not merely defined by the war. Both these institutions are strong pillars of democracy.

Both, have to work together both in War and Peace so as to achieve the national objectives and goals. However, it is well documented that these two pillars have not worked efficiently together since independence in our context due to multiple reasons.

Post-independence, Military under Political masters guided by Civil servants had to undergo two important organizational changes, firstly, the abolition of the post of Commander -in-Chief and secondly, the division of Army in four commands creating phenomenal work for the forces, so that the Political -Civil masters could further grip holds on the Armed Forces and reduce the role of military in decision making process in matters concerning national security. The Apex Defence Committee of Cabinet which worked during the 1947-48 conflict, decided to draw the ceasefire line with Pakistan purely on the national Political imperatives and the emerging demographical political leadership in J & K. The recommendations of Armed Forces to withdraw from Poonch town were unheard and rejected by the political class based on recommendations of civil servants who had no knowledge of military affairs. The professional advice of military given to Chief of Staff Committee in 1961 comprising of both Political and Civil actors regarding the impending Chinese threat and against the India's `forward policy` deployment, was disregarded totally thereby leading to a humiliating defeat of India in 1962. During the 1999 Kargil war, the CMR evenly stayed on even keel. Even after six decades of independence, there is no established mechanism by virtue of which military can render professional advice directly to Defence Minister. Invariably, it has to follow the bureaucratic route, who with their limited knowledge on the subject may present the case in an altogether different way to their political masters. The `Generalist` Bureaucracy clashing with `Specialist` Armed Forces on multiple affairs is well known. These differences further widen the CMR, and also bring in element of frustration and demotivation among senior military officers on many occasions.

India is perhaps the only major democracy where the Armed Forces Headquarters are outside the apex governmental structure. Bureaucracies, instead, have assumed the role the only via-media between the military and the government. In fact, the military is not directly involved with Ministry of Defence. The Integrated Headquarters of Defence Forces are only attached offices rather than integral component of the Ministry of Defence. This has relegated the military to a secondary position in governance leading to ineffective management of military issues. Many

thinkers have termed it as a system of `Civilian/Bureaucratic control` rather than a `Political Control`. The Chiefs of Staff have assumed the role of operational commanders of their respective forces rather than that of Chiefs of Staff to the Prime Minister and Defence Minister.

CMR have been influenced by a large extent the considerable differences in Pay, Perks, Privileges, Promotional aspects apart from other things between Civil & Military parlors. The IAS, IPS and majority of the Organized Group `A` services have a flat rank structure up to, at least, Joint Secretary level and enjoy drastic edge over the Armed Forces for promotion to higher ranks. The promotion thresholds of IAS and IPS are almost identical and have a huge advantage in terms of length of service on which the officers are promoted to various ranks, this is not the case of Armed Forces. The adverse pyramid rank structure and promotional thresholds of the Armed Forces officers entail lesser grade pay / pay scale at same length of service as compared to the IAS, IPS and Organized Group `A` services, thus, drawing lesser overall pay over large years of service till superannuation. This results in huge dual disadvantage, in terms of status and financial parity for the Armed Forces, as compared to the IAS/ IPS/ Group `A` services. The new Warrant of Precedence of 1979, disregards executive responsibility and length of service. The number of articles has also been reduced to 26, when the size and complexity of the system has vastly increased. The decline in rank and order of precedence of the Armed Forces since Independence is another indicator of growing gap in CMR. The morale of the Armed Forces has taken a new low with the recent injustice been done by the Seventh Pay Commission without even addressing the anomalies of Fifth and Sixth Pay Commission reports.

7. Research Questions

The questions that the research in its course will analyze are as follows: -

- (a) What is the Mandate of the Government for the role of Bureaucracy and Armed Forces for India in 21st century?
- (b) Genesis of problem by virtue of which there has been a widening gap in CMR in Indian context.
- (c) How the Socio-political & economic changes in India since Independence have affected the CMR?
- (d) Can certain constructive steps be taken by all the actors so as to improve CMR?

8. Research Methodology

8.1 Coverage. The research covers the CMR in Indian perspective and ways to make it better. The Respondents covered 20% Junior Officers, 40% Middle level and Senior level officers of both organizations respectively. Their perception on the field of research was sought. Stratified Random Sampling technique was used.

8.2 Data Collection. The Primary data was collected by Questionnaire, Case Study and Survey from within the Forces and also civil society. The secondary data was collected from existing reports and seminar proceeding orders. Information and data was collected from sources as given below: -

(a) **Books/ Literature** from Tri Services libraries (IDSA, NDC & USI) located at Delhi and the library at Pune University were the main repository of data. Books and papers by various authors, both Indian and foreign were studied. Also, various Government orders, Stipulations and Operating procedures were studied. Various Research papers on the subject in various indexed journals were referred and various seminar proceedings were referred to.

(b) **Institutions.** Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS) and relevant Directorates/Branches at Army Headquarters and Ministry of Home Affairs, Ministry of External Affairs, Ministry of Finance were approached for material.

(c) **Questionnaires.** Innovative questionnaire was framed to gather samples of perceptions of persons working for military, government agencies, and civilian population to ascertain perceptions formed by people on common issues of concern.

(d) **Open Sources.** Internet

8.3 Data Analysis. The data pertaining to Rank Structure, pay structure, Years of service required for promotion to next rank and key highlights of Central Pay Commission was collected, studied and analyzed along with the Government order on Order of Precedence for Civil Servants and Military officers. Analysis showed that there had been some remarkable indicators in all these, which highlighted the neglect of Armed forces by the Civil-Political class since independence, which has resulted the present poor state of affairs in our country.

9. Discussion.

Extensive Research suggest followings in Indian context in order to improve CMR:

- (a) **Priorities.** The past experience suggests there is a requirement to set clearly laid out procedures, structures, goals for various operations in the 3 D field. Priorities set by actors in one field will definitely interfere / cross / overlap priorities of other actors leading to conflict. Same should be avoided.
- (b) **Modus Operandi.** Modus operandi of all the actors in 3D model to be explicit. Process, procedures on accountability, funding & monitoring of activities, transparency issues should be laid out. For deployment in conflict zone, the civil actors should look into broader, long term perspective taking into consideration National goals and objectives. Once the same is done, the military staff holding high level of specialized expertise, should be allowed to plan and proceed ahead to execute the task without unnecessary interference from Political and Bureaucratic actors.

Perception Management. The prime task of Military is to create a secure, stable and robust environment for execution of tasks for achieving national goals and further development. (Homan, 2007). The Civil actors need to understand the same and support the Military. The perceptions about various issues should be narrowed by Civil & Military actors by discussing the `Social -Scientific` causes of the problem in detail.

- (c) **Demarcation of roles.** The developmental roles to be performed by all actors should be clearly understood based on their capabilities, resources and budget outlays. Overlapping of roles should be minimized or eliminated by best of the efforts. Cases of soldiers performing tasks like construction of schools and roads, conduct of computer classes for village children and such similar activities due to failure of civil administration due to security or geographical constraints require to be carried out by Civil actors only. In fact, the government should make a principle of using Civil actors as much as possible & military forces only when necessary.

Achieving Goals. A major clash takes place between Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Surface and Transport and Ministry of External Affairs on the timeframes by which certain projects were to be executed and budget spent. Blame game on issues of `Commitment & Seriousness` in planning, role allocation, execution and monitoring, once the projects are delayed or fail begin leading to bad relations in long run. Hence, following ``Holistic Approach `` with proper planning and `Deep Analysis` is the need of the hour.

- (d) **Coordination.** Coordination issues due to unique internal modus operandi, compartmentalization, setting up of Intra Ministry priorities and finalizing the time frame for finalization of projects are inherent in our country. These issues if not handled by all actors in a logical way, may lead to roadblocks, which are detrimental to the country`s progress.
- (e) **Bringing in More Actors.** To improve, CMR there is a need to diversify Civilian input by involving various Non-Governmental Organizations(NGOs) and Civil Society Organizations for conflict prevention, focus on knowledge & expertise, in pre-planning, evaluation & consultation.
- (f) **Element of flexibility.** Integration of Civil Military expertise for planning and coordination, more secondment of staff between different Ministries and also with International organization in key position can greatly help to develop shared understanding of Synergy between Defence, Diplomacy & Development (Beijnum & Goor ,2006; Goor & Callenbach ,2007).

Early settlement of contentious issues. There is a requirement to look into issues raised by Armed Forces over disagreement over the recommendations of various Central Pay Commissions, so as to address all outstanding issues of Status, Financial benefits and Order of Precedence for improving the CMR.

10. Limitations and future research directions

This research paper provides an insight on understanding the reasons for increased gaps in CMR in Indian context. The paper tried to provide an in-depth analysis of all dimensions of Defence Forces pre-& post- independence era. Also, it harps upon the importance of Armed Forces for any progressive nation while trying to establish the

reasons for selective upward push for Central Services vis-à-vis Defence Forces. Other factors such as socio -economic-political in context of Armed forces can be studied in future research. Also, the CMR model followed in other developing and developed nations could be further analyzed and lessons learnt.

11. Conclusion

Large scale employment of the Armed Forces in CI ops, aid to Civil authorities, proxy wars, declining Political support system, alienation of Forces from main stream, systematic degradation of Forces by Bureaucratic chain of command, compounded by down fall in status, financial benefits, privileges to Armed Forces Vis-à-vis Central Services by various Pay Commissions, non-representation of services in CPC have affected the functioning of Indian Armed Forces. We have seen many challenges emerging in retention of the trained manpower in the Forces in the past which has an indirect bearing on national defence. The fabric of Civil-Military relations in India is showing signs of wear. These trends if not arrested and corrective timely actions by political masters may lead to a point of no return.

There is a need to have Civil servants in higher defence organizations in the same lines as in UK-adapted to suit our conditions. The Ministry of Defence needs an expert Cadre and not a generalist cadre. Alongside, there is also the need to have diplomats in the ministry to provide useful inputs-keeping in mind that the defence policy and foreign policy are two sides of the same coin. The Civil servant and Military Officer must work together at each level of the organization, from the lowest to the highest -avoiding the `us and them` attitude. The political leadership has to dispense with its reluctance to direct interaction with the military leadership; why is it that a layer of ``bureaucratic experts` have to be included in affairs concerning matters of national security when you have experts from military available in Tri-Services headquarters at New Delhi.

Finally, in background of Nuclear threat and everchanging balance of powers in our region, appointment of Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) should be done on priority as already recommended by Kargil Review Committee, Group of Ministers Reports and Arun Singh Committee Reports. This is vital not only for providing single point military advisory to the Cabinet Committee on Security but also bring synergy between the three services and bureaucracy, to achieve the nations goals.

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